Between nuclear armament and economic pragmatism: Is North Korea facing change? Asia Policy Brief 2013/04, September 2013 by Frank, Rudiger
September 2013    Asia Policy Brief    2013 | 04
* Rüdiger Frank is Chair Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the University of Vienna and Head of the Department of East Asian Studies. 
 See http://ecos.univie.ac.at/.
Between nuclear 
armament and economic 
pragmatism: Is North 
Korea facing change?
Rüdiger Frank* 
Two tests of three-stage rockets in April and December 
2012 and the third nuclear test after 2006 and 2009 in 
February 2013 led to harsh sanctions. In March 2013, the 
PR China for the first time supported a corresponding 
UNSC-Resolution (no. 2094). In the first quarter of 2013 
this was followed by a North Korean reaction to the US 
and South-Korean military maneuver that was unusu-
ally strong even by P’y ngyang’s standards. While it re-
mained rhetorical, it did reach a new level with the threat 
of a nuclear first strike against US facilities. 
 The escalation was not without consequences: the 
industrial zone of Kaes ng that had been operated since 
2004, a unique Korea-internal economic project, was 
closed and has been in the process of being reopened only 
since August. Furthermore, South Korean president 
Park Geun-Hye, in office since February 2013, now finds 
it even harder to pursue rapprochement with the North. 
Such engagement is urgently necessary after years of 
stagnation under hardliner Lee Myung-Bak, and desired 
by the general public. P’y ngyang also did some direct 
The balance a year and a half after the meanwhile second hereditary power 
transfer to Kim Jong-Un (Kim Chŏng-ŭn), grandson of the founder of the 
state, is undecided. The breakdown of the system, predicted by many ana-
lysts, has not happened yet. Neither have the reforms that were expected 
from the young man who has supposedly been educated in Switzerland. The 
country is not in stagnation however – quite the opposite. What has hap-
pened in North Korea in the last two years? What development trends are 
there and how can other countries approach them? These questions are 
discussed in the light of the tense security-political and humanitarian envi-
ronment and the corresponding risks in this Asia Policy Brief.
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army and state. Suggestions that he was acting as a 
puppet of his aunt Kim Ky ng-H i and her husband 
Chang S ng-T‘aek have not been confirmed. Both do 
hold high offices, however, and are politically active. 
There are also indications for a division of labor. A politi-
cal future is expected for Kim’s younger sister Kim Y -
Ch ng. His older brothers Kim Ch ng-Nam (living in Ma-
cao) and Kim Ch ng-Ch’ l currently do not seem to play 
a decisive role.
Leadership style: New attitudes
The speed and scope at which he set accents of his own 
in the public media support our assumptions about Kim 
Jong-Un’s relative independence. Again, the contrast to 
his father is striking: Kim Jong-il avoided public appear-
ances in the first three years after he came to power and 
did not give a single speech to his people. In contrast, Kim 
Jong-Un used the parade in honor of the 100th birthday 
of his grandfather on April 15th, 2012, to speak from the 
stage at Kim Il-Sung Square in front of tens of thousands 
of his people. Once again, it became clear how much his 
outer appearance, such as girth, hair cut and clothes, but 
also his body language were aligned with those of his 
grandfather Kim Il-Sung, who is highly respected and 
idealized in North Korea. In January 2013, the supreme 
leader held the first New Year’s speech after this tradition 
had been suspended for 17 years under the rather remote 
Kim Jong-Il, who had replaced it by a joint editorial in the 
country’s leading media.
 Kim Jong-Un also quickly showed that he was not 
to be trifled with. When visiting a theme park near his 
grandfather’s place of birth, he harshly criticized the in-
sufficient condition of the facilities and the responsible 
functionaries under the eyes of the state media. In the 
course of his short term of office, the country has already 
gone through three minsters of defense. Elsewhere the 
staff carrousel is turning quickly as well, as if he wanted 
to show every official under the supreme leader just who 
the master of North Korea is. A prominent example is 
damage to itself: Foreign Direct Investment was intense-
ly promoted in the context of a diversification strategy to 
get out of the unilateral dependence on the overpowering 
economic partner China. For the foreseeable future, such 
investment will now be lower than the country’s potential 
would permit.
Consolidation of power: 
Sooner than expected
Kim Jong-Il – the father of the current leader – was official-
ly declared successor 14 years before he took power at the 
age of 52. He had been intensely prepared for his function 
for at least two decades. Under consideration of this, there 
was some skepticism when his son Kim Jong-Un took 
over the helm in December 2011, aged only 27 or 28 – his 
precise date of birth is not known. Only one year earlier, 
he had been presented to the public at a Worker’s Party 
conference, but was not explicitly declared successor. The 
Party therefore assumed the role of the kingmaker and 
generally declared Kim Jong-Un the “Great successor of 
the revolutionary cause of chuch’e and outstanding leader 
of party, army and the people” two days after the death of 
Kim Jong-Il.
 In contrast to his father, he did not observe a mourning 
period of three years, but almost immediately took those 
offices that supported his absolute claim to power. On April 
11th, 2012, he became First Secretary of the Workers’ Party 
of Korea. Like Kim Jong-Il before him, Kim Jong-Un waived 
a formal position in the government. His grandfather, who 
died in 1994, is “Eternal President”. The cabinet is chaired 
by a prime minister. The nominal head of state is the chair-
man of the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly 
(the parliament). However, according to article 100 of the 
constitution, Kim Jong-Un is not only the supreme military 
commander but also the “Supreme Leader” of North Ko-
rea in his office as First Chairman of the National Defense 
Commission that he took over on April 13th, 2012.
 Thus, Kim Jong-Un firmly held all three pillars of 
power only four months after his father’s death: party, 
3In April 2012, the central monument for Kim Il-Sung on 
Mansudae hill in P’y ngyang was modified, moved aside 
and supplemented by an equally large bronze statue of 
Kim Jong-Il. The latter has meanwhile undergone its first 
modification.
 Also in April 2012, Kim Jong-Il was designated 
“Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Ko-
rea” following the example of his father, who had been 
designated “Eternal President” in 1998 by a change of 
the constitution. The guiding ideology was renamed 
“Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism”, posters and slogans were 
modified accordingly. At the annual meeting of the parlia-
ment that took place a few days later, Kim Jong-Il was also 
declared the “Eternal Chairman of the National Defense 
Commission”. The latest version of the badges worn over 
the hearts of all North Koreans now shows the faces of 
both deceased leaders.
 The basic rationale behind this is easy to understand. 
For reasons of age, Kim Jong-Un cannot draw any direct 
connection to his grandfather, the source of all legitimacy 
in North Korea. The link to his father alone would also 
be insufficient, since the latter avoided placing his own 
person clearly at the center of the leader cult during his 
lifetime. While Kim Jong-Il’s picture hung in every apart-
ment, there were no bronze statues or bank notes with his 
likeness. Except for the red flower “Kimjongilia”, his im-
age was absent from public squares, and not a single one 
of them was named after him. All of this has been changed 
radically now.
 However, Kim Jong-Un is taking a risk by modifying 
the icon-like images of his grandfather (the new statue at 
the Mansudae-hill now wears glasses, a Western suit, ap-
pears decades older and is smiling). This and supplement-
ing it with another, far less charismatic person may dilute 
the power of this revolutionary symbol. In a system based 
on ideology as much as that of North Korea, this may have 
fatal consequences.
 However, Kim Jong-Un made it clear early on that he 
was going to found his claim to power not exclusively on 
the rapid rise and just as rapid fall of Ri Y ng-Ho, Vice 
Marshal and politburo member, who was relieved of all 
his offices in July 2012. Vice Marshal Ch’oe Ryong-Hae, 
deemed the number two in the system, is still secure in 
his position at this time.
 The first ever introduction of a current “First Lady” 
in the history of North Korea was another sign of great 
self-confidence. The first wife of Kim Il-Sung and mother 
of Kim Jong-Il was only glorified long after her death. The 
wives of Kim Jong-Il were never mentioned officially at 
all. “Comrade Ri Sol-Ju” was presented to the surprised 
public as the new leader’s wife at a somewhat bizarre cul-
tural performance including Disney figures. The attrac-
tive, self-confident young lady with her Western dresses 
and practically short hair quickly became a fashion icon 
for North Korean women. When she reappeared by her 
husband’s side at official events after a brief break, her 
pregnancy was already obvious. It is assumed that she 
gave birth to a daughter at the end of 2012.
 Such an insight into his private life had never been 
offered by founder and supreme leader Kim Il-Sung, even 
though he was described as charismatic and close to his 
people and appeared sociable and approachable. Is this 
the personality of the new man in the lead or is it a well-
calculated maneuver to support his image among the 
people? We can only speculate. However, there are other 
changes as well, ones that very clearly have a targeted 
political background.
Ideological adjustment: 
Risky game with symbols
The central question just after Kim Jong-Un took power 
was: On what would he base his legitimacy as the su-
preme leader. This is of the highest importance for in-
ternal political stability and coherence in the system of 
North Korea. Kim Jong-Un decided to merge the persons 
of his father and grandfather in all aspects. In January 
2012, a mounted statue of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il 
was unveiled on the premises of the Mansudae art studio. 
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The values nominally deviate from the much lower infor-
mation from South Korea, but are surprisingly well cor-
related with it (r=0.66 in 2005–2012) and therefore may 
at least be used as trend lines.
 Several things are remarkable about Figure 1: in con-
trast to what would be expected of typically socialist prop-
aganda, the curves do not continually point upwards. This 
makes them appear more credible. The reform phase of 
2002 to 2005 is clearly visible. We find that the state has 
apparently been planning a higher growth of expenses 
than income since 2009, which implies external financ-
ing of this deficit. Not least, we see a much lower, i.e. more 
realistic planned growth rate for 2013. The influence of 
Kim Jong-Un, and possibly the new prime minister Pak 
Pong-Ju, can be assumed here.
Foreign trade: Rising, but unilateral
The economy of North Korea seems to be growing, but in 
the light of earlier massive contraction after 1990 and a 
low starting level, fast and major improvements are not 
yet to be expected on the current path. This is true in spite 
of the country’s potential. In addition to the large number 
of well-trained and highly disciplined workers and a long 
border towards China offering a direct connection to this 
ideology but on actual achievements as well. These include 
an explicit focus on the improvement of material living con-
ditions of his people. For this purpose, a policy that can 
best be called “Bread and Circuses” has been developed. 
The access to food and consumer goods has been im-
proved. The effectiveness of such measures notwithstand-
ing, old theme parks have been renovated and new ones 
created – including a dolphinarium in the capital. 
Economic growth: Slow but steady
To keep up this policy and to be able to offer more to his in-
creasingly materialistically oriented people, Kim Jong-Un 
needs a functioning and prospering economy. In the light 
of the wide-spread desolate situation of energy scarcity 
and lack of staple food, this is quite an ambitious goal. 
South Korean sources such as the Bank of Korea assume 
that the gross national product of North Korea grew by 
0.8 percent in 2011 and by 1.2 percent in 2012 to about 
30 Billion US$, which is 2.6 percent of the value of its 
neighbor South Korea. There are no official North Korean 
macroeconomic statistics. However, the country’s media 
publish annual data on the state budget. In the light of the 
lack of private property in the economy, these figures can 
be assumed to be official estimates of economic growth. 
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Figure 1: Revenue and expenses of the North Korean state budget
Legend:   Achieved revenue    Planned revenue    Planned expenses
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5Economic reforms: 
The big breakthrough is still pending
Since the collapse of the Eastern Block, the world has 
been waiting for a corresponding reaction from North Ko-
rea. However, neither a collapse as in Eastern Europe, nor 
the kind of aggressive reforms and opening policy wit-
nessed in China have happened yet. Kim Jong-Il visited 
China in 1983, which led to the first joint venture law of 
his country in 1984, but the government did little up to 
July 2002. The reforms started after this were comprehen-
sive but unsuccessful for various reasons. 
 Some of the changes that happened spontaneously 
during the famine of 1995 to 1997 were made official in 
2002. The government prices were adjusted to those on 
the country-wide farmers’ markets, subsidies were elimi-
nated, the currency was depreciated by factor 75(!) as 
compared to the US-Dollar, the two foreign exchange cer-
tificates were discontinued and many other actions were 
taken. However, following the Chinese example, the 2002 
reform was targeted at agriculture. The relatively small 
group of farmers and traders profited, but the majority 
of the urban population had to pay higher prices, which 
led to a massive inflation of 200 percent and more per 
year. The expected funds from the Eastern neighbor did 
not materialize because of an unexpected public reaction 
in Japan related to the abduction issue. In early 2003, the 
US demonstrated that it would not limit itself to verbal 
attacks on the “Axis of Evil” when they invaded Iraq. Ac-
cordingly, the reforms were halted. A phase of socialist 
neo-conservatism with an attempted return to the values 
of the 1980s followed. This policy failed not least because 
the monetization of society had set off a process that could 
not be stopped anymore. 
 When power passed to Kim Jong-Un, a new decisive 
step towards substantial reforms was expected; it is yet 
outstanding. However, on April 1st, 2013, Pak Pong-Ju was 
made prime minister. Pak is deemed an economic prag-
matist and is connected with the reforms of July 2002. In 
2012 there were rumors according to which the “meas-
huge market, the country also has considerable deposits 
of natural resources. South Korean estimates suggest, 
among others, 2000 tons of gold, 5000 tons of silver, 2.9 
million tons of copper, 5 billion tons of iron, 21 million tons 
of zinc, 6 billion tons of magnetite and 20 billion tons of 
coal in North Korea. 
 With or without reforms, the income that can be 
achieved by export in order to finance imports is par-
ticularly important to a widely isolated and sanctioned 
country like North Korea. As Figure 2 shows, the trend 
is clearly going upwards. A connection to the above eco-
nomic growth can be assumed.
 According to the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA) the foreign trade turnover of North Korea 
(without trade with South Korea) was almost seven bil-
lion US$ in 2012. The foreign trade deficit is about one 
billion US$, but has been mostly constant and was even 
reduced in relative terms. The by far most important ex-
port product in 2012 were mineral products with a share 
of almost 60 percent, primarily coal and iron ore. Miner-
als, and mainly crude oil, were the most important import 
product at about 21 percent, followed by machines and 
vehicles (16 percent) and textiles (14 percent). The share 
of Germany in North Korean foreign trade was a mediocre 
0.5 percent (36 million US$). The main trading partner in 
2012 was China, at more than 88 percent of the turnover.
 This overwhelming dominance of the big neighbor 
and close ally is a relatively new phenomenon; in 2001, 
Japan was the most important trading partner, at a much 
lower percentage share. The government in P’y ngyang 
is seriously concerned about the unilateral and strong 
dependence on China, and has also publicly stated this 
discomfort. North Korea has been actively striving for 
development of alternative markets, including Europe. 
Due to the reservations of governments and investors 
and the fatal human rights situation and adventurous 
foreign policy, however, these efforts have shown little 
success so far.
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early 1990s. These efforts have shown varying degrees 
of success. Since 2013, it became known that Mongolia 
is interested in joining in order to use the harbors on 
North Korean territory in the Ras n zone for shipping of 
raw materials. After a failed attempt in 2002 there is cur-
rently another special economic area with China being 
developed in the Northwest on two islands between the 
border towns of Sin iju und Dandong. 
 In the Southwest, there is the Kaes ng Industrial 
Zone, where about 50,000 North Korean workers are em-
ployed by South Korean companies, producing most of the 
inter-Korean trade. However, this is barely more than a 
workbench of South Korea extended towards the North. 
The glossy side of the not always uncontroversial South 
Korean economic miracle is presented here, doubtlessly 
with a considerable ideological effect on the North Korean 
workers and all whom they tell about their experiences. In 
April 2013, skeptics in North Korea took the opportunity 
and closed the ideologically risky zone in the context of 
an escalation of the situation after the third North Korean 
nuclear test and the annual joint military maneuver of the 
ures of June 28th” were to give the economic units more 
freedom to decide on their production and more indepen-
dence in the use of surpluses. However, the parliament 
did not treat these items in its extraordinary meeting in 
September 2012, but decided on an educational reform 
instead. The number of mandatory school years was in-
creased from eleven to twelve, explicitly with the objec-
tive to improve training in technical and practical sub-
jects – not in the ideological area.
Special economic zones: 
Costs versus benefits
The role of special economic areas in the considerable 
(market) economic development of China after 1978 sug-
gests that we pay special attention to similar projects in 
North Korea. At the moment there are three active special 
economic areas, with a fourth one being built. Ras n
is located in the Northeast, in the country triangle of 
China-Russia-North Korea. The attempt to combine the 
advantages of the three countries, which complement 
each other at least on paper, has been going on since the 
Source: Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) Legend:   Exports    Imports    Turnover
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Figure 2: Foreign Trade of North Korea 1990–2012, in million US$
7made it will never be content either. They want more pow-
er, more money, more wealth. The future of North Korea 
will be determined by how the leadership under Kim 
Jong-Un will handle this challenge. In the light of what 
we already know about the new leader and the systemic 
necessity of reforms, we can be cautiously optimistic – in 
spite of the war rhetoric that may be merely targeted at 
stabilizing the system to prepare for the great risk of re-
forms in the end.
 What can the West do? To be sure, the strategic deci-
sion will be made in North Korea. But if other countries 
do not simply sit back and continue waiting for a collapse, 
they will have the limited opportunity to influence the 
environment for such decision making. The previous path 
of sanctions has brought few actual results. The system 
with all of its negative effects on the people continues to 
exist. The South Korean “Sunshine Policy” from 1998 to 
2008 is unfairly called naïve. All of the above positive 
changes happened back then. The architects of this long-
term policy relied on economic cooperation independent 
of the political day-to-day-business, thus strengthening 
the powers of the North Korean market and reducing the 
government’s fear of the related risks to the point where 
true reforms would become more likely. 
 This option still exists. In particular the US is current-
ly preventing North Korea from gaining a stable access 
to international goods and financial markets. Such access 
is, however, vital for export-oriented growth with a focus 
on industry, which offers the most promising develop-
ment strategy in the light of the North Korean economic 
structure. Blocking such access is doubtlessly justifiable 
morally and legally. But it also means accepting the gov-
ernment in P’y ngyang will bind itself to China even more 
closely due to a lack of alternatives, further develop the 
nuclear threat, and neglect necessary changes. The cur-
rent system of North Korea is not sustainable. There is no 
way around opening up and engaging in liberalization. 
Other countries can, however, influence when and how 
this process will take place.
US and South Korea. In August 2013, however, economic 
pragmatism in the North seems to have won, and negotia-
tions on reopening were successful.
Outlook: Can the new middle class be an 
agent of change?
The monetization of the North Korean economy since the 
late 1990s had and still has considerable social effects. 
Apart from a small elite that is mainly invisible to most in 
everyday life, North Korea was characterized by almost 
unique equality for decades. Personal ambitions that 
North Koreans have, just like everyone else, could only be 
achieved by using political capital. The right family and 
social background, combined with relationships and spe-
cial zeal in meeting the state requirements were the only 
factors for success.
 This has changed. Money has recovered many of its 
once-lost functions in North Korea, weakening the value 
of political capital. The system’s influence is still strong, 
but receding, and has ceased to be a monopoly. Cadres 
with access to the corresponding opportunities, as well as 
people with a business sense and good relations with Chi-
na, have found ways to profit from the traces of a develop-
ing market economy in the country. A class that proudly 
presents its new wealth has developed. Cell phones are 
a status symbol. At about 300 EUR, they are not cheap. 
Still, the only cell phone operator Koryolink, a subsidiary 
of Egyptian ORASCOM, says that there are 2 million of 
them already, with a rising trend. The number of private 
cars is increasing. Many are produced domestically with 
licenses. High-quality household appliances, computers, 
even 7" Tablet-PCs “Samjiyon” and air conditioners ap-
pear more and more frequently. People are developing 
more self-confidence.
 These “blessings” of the new time are limited to a grow-
ing minority that mainly lives in the capital city of P’y ng-
yang but is visible to all. Those not belonging to it yet are 
hoping for upward social mobility. If it is refused, their new 
but unfulfilled wishes will cause the same reactions as 
back in socialist Eastern Europe. Those who have already 
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Further reading:
For more publications by Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Frank on North 
Korea, see http://univie.academia.edu/RuedigerFrank.
On the society of North Korea before the changes in the 
Mid- 1990s, see Helen Louise Hunter (1999): Kim Il-Song’s 
North Korea, Westport and London: Praeger.
General statistics information on North Korea can be 
found at the Bank of Korea (www.bok.or.kr), on foreign 
trade at the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
(www.kotra.or.kr), for a list of natural resources, see 
the Information System for Resources in North Korea 
(www.irenk.net).
The official position of North Korea can be found, 
among others on the website of the party newspaper 
Rodong Sinmun (www.rodong.rep.kp).
If you have any questions or if you wish to subscribe 
to the “Asia Policy Brief” please write to 
asien@bertelsmann-stiftung.de.
All “Asia Policy Brief“ editions can be downloaded 
from www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/asien.
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